One couldn't describe the feeling with enough accuracy, having grown already too experienced in the fashion of recklessly living as though the world above couldn't really exist for us anymore. That's where only Hannah has heartily turned me in some sort of an intellectual warrior who couldn't compromise for less than making this world more human, therefore much more inhabitable. Or in sight of the impossibility, at least transforming the way we think of it thereof.
In that "essentiality" I depart from the discourse of Cox, for with the total obliteration of metaphysics we've also forsaken altogether with religious and intellectual traditions and dogmas the pasts and therefore the world itself as well. I've losy my faith on the Left and refuse to embrace the Right; in all not unlike Lessing I remain critically committed to the world with the only purpose of making it more human by mere discourse. It's dangerous only in the sense that I've gained this cosmological view only from the raw experiences of history and current world affairs, but all the more realizing that by themselves alone they keep me from being able to move in any sort of invisible space I swim in the vast ocean of singled-out ideas in order to find my way around within the traditions, as to break away from this age-old dualism that so irreparably alienated us from the world as our forerunners received it.
No matter how dangerous the warfare we witness we can't let go of the study of the Classics, the Bible and the philosophers, without forgetting for a second Jasper's lesson on the philosophy of politics. It seems natural to me being driven to the public realm and world politics, not unlike Heschel would. The materialist view has turned the left into a bankrupt dialectic, we must hence strive for an existential answer for the interests of liberal politics, not unlike the Biblical prophets.
The pivotal lesson here, for which I must remain critically committed to liberalism is that for us the essence of politics isn't necessarily democracy, but freedom. Once we can no longer turn towards the Polis and the tragedies of the French Revolution still haunts us, we can't so blindly rely on democracy, social-contracts, humanism and logical positivism, all of which can already be judged as sheer fiction. Their triumph would be a loss for humanity.
Dr. Luchtins phrased it wonderfully through Hannah: The danger inherent to the French Revolution is that if all men are equal, when you're not equal it means I can kill you because you're not human. Sadly enough this is background on which the Nazi Holocausts rests, and most possibly the Arab genocide underway. The Israeli state has inherited materialistic dialects and the democracy of the French Revolution instead of Biblical humanism. What I call Anti-Humanism.
The actual lack of this freedom that is at the root of liberal politics is a turn-asides towards the human condition. All in all I'm trying to explain that as thinker I shouldn't fear the making of politics. In the current state of affairs politics is the only way back to philosophy, since we're almost unable to think of heaven at all no more, and with the obliteration of the world above we forsake any possible way to enter back the human world. The way of "politics" was perhaps somewhere hovering on us since Nietzche and in his denial of Aristotelian metaphysics only Heidegger bequested us this rebellion as a testament, that becomes second in importance to no other idea of the 20th century because we're talking about the same man who in its escape from Aristotle returned the most inhumaine form of Ontology with all the political implications it had for being-thereness-in-the-world. We learn from the brilliancy of his mistakes and his potential crimes, as Arendt and Jaspers would put it.
Dwelling exclusively on the metaphysical before the dismise of the human, is a deliberate choice to suspend judgement and deliver it to Man, not to men and therefore to surrender to the fallacy of ethics on an entirely otherwordly ground. That of ontology and so wholly alienated from that "place of dwelling" we're so forcefully attempting to recover.
But how can we recover it when our thinking space has disappeared by vanishing into the category of mythology with all our gods, traditions and histories? We're unable to think (unable to move in invisible spaces) and since our traditions have remained shattered for a long time we can no more move beyond the limitations imposed by nature, henceforth by means of "reason" as our only ally we've obliterated both worlds -the one above and the one below, with all the spaces in between humans that they contained. Diminishing to an unworthy status the quintessence of the human condition - the earth.
We're returned to a pre-rational world, that same world that Biblical revelation aimed to correct. Then moreover if the quest for human meaning is a denial of human freedom it is requiring from us a backwards travail from Greek questions towards (and within) a world that has separated men by means of politics, not exclusively of democracy. A turn towards a world that is both history and space, for an eternal world is certainly a harvest for questions of whatness and thisness (amazement) that do not systematically lead to judgement as the end of a syllogism (the idea of Leibniz). The questions are politically impractical; an eternal world doesn't see the sheer need for memory.
While it's true that the world of history (by necessity separated from nature) can't find a home without a Polis, this can't be a city of deities; citizens must be the dwellers of this space, citizens for whom history goes beyond divine origin into striving. But if the Gods are all dead as well, in order to "judge" anything at all we need to bring them back from their graves, because no practical solutions for the concern of the Polis are to be found wherenever the possibility for speculation (secularly speaking) has vanished.
To conclude a remark from Hannah's study of Augustine: The central idea of humanity is not expectation, but memory, without which the former is no longer possible. A static world is that of the Kantian mind, certainly eternal and unable to move, therefore not human enough and impaired for judgement, because memory is not contigent in a world that has always existed. The very same thinking at the root of that age-old Western problem of history that brought about the 19th century obsession with ideology and history (dialectically juxtaposed), replaced by the 20th century concern for revisionism of that same history. The consequence of rooting anything human artificially on reason, which isn't to be found in neither world above or below.
Judgment isn't based on reason, but on thinking (and experiences of willing) that are quite not the same. Thinking in actuality is the permanent updating of representation, the sin of reason is inertia. Reason suspends judgment in its radical loss of the world. Thinking does save the earth and with it the human condition, but on the condition of thinking our actions. Not when it suspends them to a realm of arbitrariness, alienating the two dimensions of man from one another and vanquishing the distinction between good and evil (atrophy of the senses) by a sacralization of politics and equality and justice that the Biblical weltanschauung tried to correct but using the elements available in the pre-rational world, rather than thiking from a vacuum whereby no living creature has dwelt but force, that "movement" the Pre-Socratics failed at distinguishing and remained condemned to their earthly prison. The problem was first solved by the travailing of Abraham with God's dream and designs (man was a partner in creation), breaking away from the inertia of nature.