Freedoms

The freedoms of the world is how I've allegedly decided to name Rosenzweig's "elements", with a double narrative in mind... in one hand I take the narrative of history from the Bible, it's memory and in the other hand the narrative of technology from Heidegger, it's hope. The doubly-binded source of humanity against the backdrop of the doubly-binded nature of modernity. Let's see how this hermeneutic compartmentalization into freedoms fits into our definition of modernity.

The modern world is different from the pre-modern in that it is founded not in traditions but in freedom, whereas freedom itself cannot be a foundation for anything, at least not for anything secure. Hegel and Heidegger provide us with a model based on language - the foundation in itself when achieved is only replaced by the abyss; the German is a lot clearer by phrasing "Grund" [foundation] as the forerunner of "Abgrund" [abyss] which literally means "out of the foundation" or "from the foundation". If the elements are taken out of Rosenzweig's mathematical model of "elements" and translated into freedoms, in order to deliver them from hierarchies in the narrative then God, man and world as freedoms on their own right are empty foundations, in that their isolation cause them to be become merely an abyss for themselves, a vertiginous abyss in which by searching each other those freedoms negate freedom itself and modernity, their denial of freedom comes in the form of quest for meaning opposed to quest for truth. It is a question of representations and not of identities. This hasn't solved my problem.

The problem lies in that the paradox of freedom contains in itself the paradox of truth, namely in the disguise of the possibilities already alienated when we define modernity as an impossibility. The impossibility to mend the frailty of the world turns both positively and negatively represented in thought thus: Positively the impossibility opens an accessible throughway to modes of interpretation, a desperate need for an exit. Negatively it is a struggle between Bergson and Hegel, one by claiming that the possibility of negation does not exist in nature and the other that negation is actually the structure of thinking that gives us modernity. Rightly Arendt said that modern men have a gap with their world. The possibility that both Bergson and Hegel can argue is already a symptom and a consequence of the modern imagination. What we're facing here is that my question of freedoms isn't a question, but a paradox that produces questions, by the sheer force of necessity historically speaking and by the sheer force of utilitarianism technologically speaking. This would have been by no means possible without Kierkegaard and the imperative necessity of choices, the choice of yourself as a philosopher, the choice of yourself as an individual which has become modernly possible. The quest for individuality is part of that Protestantion that foreran Modernity. But the protestation it in itself paradoxical in the sense that it is not limited, it can protest itself and the negation of itself, therefore it has in itself the ability of creation altogether with the ability of destruction. The individual can no longer behold traditions because he is no longer part of the community, he is by himself. This condition is what gives me the opportunity to make radical choices whether neutral or good or bad, the deliberate independence of choice already keeps him from being able to conversate, speech is no longer a possibility. It is all translation.